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ABSTRACT 
We  consider  a  class  of  matrix  games  in  which  successful  strategies  are  rewarded  by 
high  reproductive  rates,  so become  more  likely to participate  in subsequent  playings  of the 
game.  Thus,  over  time,  the  strategy  mix  should  evolve  to  some  type  of  optimal  or  stable 
state.  Maynard  Smith  and  Price  (1973) have  introduced  the  concept  of ESS (evolutionarily 
stable  strategy)  to describe  a stable  state  of  the  game.  We  attempt  to model  the  dynamics 
of  the  game  both  in  the  continuous  case,  with  a system  of  non-linear  first-order  differen- 
tial  equations,  and  in  the  discrete  case,  with  a system  of  non-linear  difference  equations. 
Using  this  model,  we look  at the  notions  of stability  and  asymptotic  behavior.  Our  notion 
of  stable  equilibrium  for  the  continuous  dynamic  includes,  but  is somewhat  more  general 
than,  the  notion  of  ESS. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over  the  past  5 years  there  has  been  much  work  in  applying  concepts  of 
game  theory  to  model  various  kinds  of  animal  conflict.  In  particular  the 
definition  of  ESS  (evolutionarily  stable  strategy)  of  Maynard  Smith  and 
Price  [4] seems  to  have  provided  a  good  notion  of  stable  equilibrium,  and 
most  models  that  have  appeared  have  contained  one  or  more  ESSs.  Fre- 
quently,  statements  have  been  made  about  the  behavior  of  a game-theoretic 
model  away  from  an  ESS,  and  sometimes  simulation  studies  have  been 
done  to  track  this  behavior.  But,  to  our  knowledge,  there  has  been  no 
systematic  attempt  to  produce  a  notion  of  dynamic  which  might  apply  to 
the  type  of  games  being  studied,  and  to  relate  the  notion  of  stable 
equilibrium  for  this  dynamic  to  the  notion  of  ESS. 
In  Sec.  2 we  consider  a  general  class  of  games  (which  includes  the  linear 
games  usually  studied),  and  provide  a  general  definition  of  ESS.  In  Sec.  3 
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we  introduce  a  notion  of  dynamic  for  both  the  continuous  (overlapping 
generations)  and  the  discrete  case.  Our  main  theorem  is  that  under  a 
non-degeneracy  condition,  an  ESS  is  always  stable  for  the  continuous 
dynamic.  This  is  not  however  true  for  the  discrete  dynamic,  essentially 
because  of  an  overshoot  phenomenon.  Finally  we  give  an  example  of  a 
dynamically  stable  equilibrium  point  which  is  not  an  ESS. 
2.  EVOLUTIONARILY  STABLE  STATES 
Suppose  we  have  a  population  of  individuals  who  are  playing  a  game  in 
competition  with  one  another.  There  are  n  possible  pure  strategies  available, 
numbered  1 to  n,  and  at  each  instant,  every  individual  is using  one  of  these 
strategies.  For  each  strategy  i lets,  be  the  proportion  of individuals  who  are, 
at  that  moment,  using  strategy  i.  The  probability  vector  s=(s~,s~,...,s,)  is 
called  the  state  vector  of  the  population.  We  assume  that  the  payoff  per  unit 
time  to  an  individual  using  strategy  i is a function  F(ils)  of  the  state  s of  the 
population.  We  refer  to  F(ils)  as  the fitness  of  i in  state  s. 
The  basic  idea  is this:  the  more  fit  a strategy  is at  any  moment,  the  more 
likely  it  is to  be  employed  in  the  future.  The  mechanism  behind  this  is either 
that  individuals  tend  to  switch  to  strategies  that  are  doing  well,  or  that 
individuals  bear  offspring  who  tend  to  use  the  same  strategies  as  their 
parents,  and  the  fitter  the  individual,  the  more  numerous  his  offspring.  In 
any  case,  as  time  goes  on,  the  strategy  mix  s may  change.  A  dynamic  game 
theory  will  look  at  how  the  state  vector  s moves  with  time,  and  will  look  for 
equilibrium  states  and  examine  their  stability. 
Indeed,  let  K=  {p  : Zpi  = 1, pj 2  0)  be  the  state  space  of  the  population. 
That  is,  each  element  p E K  represents  a  possible  strategy  mix.  A  state  p  in 
K  is  called  an  equilibrium  state  if  the  fitnesses  F(ilp)  are  equal  for  all  pure 
strategies  i  actually  used  by  individuals  in  a  population  in  state  p.  We  let 
supp(p),  the  support  of  p,  denote  this  set  of  pure  strategies.  That  is, 
supp(p)  = {i :p,#O}.  An  equilibrium  state,  if  undisturbed,  should  persist, 
since  all  existing  strategies  are  equally  fit.  However,  in  real  life,  an 
equilibrium  state  will  almost  surely  be  disturbed,  so  that  we  are  only 
interested  in  it  if  the  system,  once  disturbed,  returns  to  the  equilibrium 
state.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  equilibrium  is  said  to  be  stable. 
If  q is in  K,  let  us  define  F(qlp)=CqiF(ilp).  We  can  think  of  F(qlp)  as 
the  average  fitness  of  a  group  of  individuals  playing  the  game  against 
members  of  a population  in  state  p,  when  a proportion  qi of  the  group  uses 
strategy  i.  If  we  let  e, denote  the  state  of  a population  using  strategy  i only, 
then  F(e,lp)=F(ilp).  Observe  that  if  p  is  an  equilibrium  state,  then 
F(qjp)=  F(plp)  whenever  supp(q)  is  contained  in  supp(p). 
When  should  an  equilibrium  statep  be  stable?  Maynard-Smith  and  Price 
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in  that  it  uses  no  more  machinery  than  we  have  already  developed,  and 
requires  no  further  assumptions.  It  is  probably  for  this  reason  that  it  has 
appeared  so  much  in  the  literature  recently.  They  propose  that  p  should  be 
stable  if  whenever  a  small  subpopulation  switches  to  state  q,  its  average 
fitness  in  the  perturbed  state  will  be  less  than  the  average  fitness  of  the 
remaining  population.  This  idea  motivates  the  following  definition. 
DEFINITION  [4] 
A  state  p  is  called  an  ESS  (evolutionarily  stable  state)  if  for  every  state 
qzp,  if we  letj=(l-e)p+eq  (the  perturbed  state),  then  F(qlj)<F(p(jT) 
for  sufficiently  small  E  > 0. 
We  remark  that  E in  this  definition  measures  the  proportion  of players  in 
the  q-group.  Observe  that  an  ESS  is  certainly  an  equilibrium  state.  Indeed, 
letting  q be  the  pure  state  e, (concentrated  at  i) and  letting  E approach  zero, 
we  have  P(ilp)  <  F(plp).  If  I  IS in  supp(p),  this  implies  that  F(ilp)= 
F(pJp),  since  thep-average  of  the  numbers  F(ilp)  equals  F(pjp). 
Suppose  p  is  an  equilibrium  point.  Define  the  matrix  A  by  the  formula 
ati=  $F(ijp). 
/ 
Take  qfp,  and  setp=(l  -~)p+~q.  Expanding  F(qJp?  and  F(plp3  aboutp 
and  subtracting  yields 
F(qlp)-F(Plp)=F(qlP)-F(PlP)+&[(q-P)A(q-P)]+o(&).  (1) 
Thus  the  lst-order  advantage  of  the  q-group  over  the  p-group  is  given  by 
the  formula 
If  p  is  an  ESS,  then  for  every  q  in  K  this  should  be  non-positive  if  E is 
sufficiently  small.  Therefore,  we  must  have  F(qlp)-  F(p(p)  < 0 for  every  q 
in  K. 
We  will  now  introduce  a  non-degeneracy  condition,  which  ensures  that 
the  lst-order  advantage  of  the  q-group  over  thep-group  is  strictly  negative 
for  sufficiently  small  E. First  of all,  if i is not  in  supp(p),  we  will  require  that 
F(ilp)  <  F(plp).  Strategies  that  do  not  occur  in  an  ESS  are,  if they  emerge, 
strictly  less  fit  than  the  strategies  that  do  occur.  Secondly,  if  i is in  supp(p), 
then,  as  we  have  seen,  F(ilp)=F(plp),  and  so  F(qlp)=  F(p(p)  whenever 
supp(q)  c  supp(p).  That  is, if the  members  of the  q-group  restrict  themselves 
to  strategies  already  used  by  thep-group,  the  average  fitness  of  the  q-group 
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the  p-group  in  encounters  with  itself.  Thus,  to  get  a  strictly  negative 
lst-order  advantage  of  the  q-group  over  the  p-group  we  must  have  (q- 
p)A  (q -p)  < 0  whenever  supp(q)  c supp(p)  and  q fp.  Equivalently,  putting 
x = q-p,  so that  x#O,  Cx,  =O,  and  supp(x)  csupp(p),  then  we  must  have 
X,4X  < 0. 
DEFINITION 
An  equilibrium  point  p  is  a  regular  ESS  if  F(ilp)<  F(pJp)  whenever 
i 4 supp(p),  and  xAx  < 0 whenever  supp( x) c  supp(p),  x #  0,  and  Z xi = 0. 
It  is  easy  to  check,  using  (1)  and  the  discussion  following  it,  that  a 
regular  ESS  is  an  ESS.  Generically,  every  ESS  is  regular.  That  is,  in  a 
mathematically  precise  sense,  nearly  every  fitness  function  F(qJp)  is  such 
that  every  ESS  is  regular.  In  particular,  if  F  is  a  fitness  function  for  which 
ESSs  are  not  all  regular,  then  there  is  a  fitness  function  F  as  close  to  F  as 
may  be  required,  for  which  they  are.  Therefore,  since  in  any  model  of  a 
conflict  the  fitness  function  provides  only  an  approximation  to  the  real 
fitness,  we  may  always  assume  it  to  be  such  that  all  ESSs  are  regular. 
There  are  at  least  two  reasons  for  working  with  regular  ESSs.  The 
definition  of  regular  ESS  provides  what  is  in  effect  a  simple  computational 
scheme  for  checking  whether  an  equilibrium  point  is a  regular  ESS.  Details 
can  be  found  in  [2]. Secondly,  certain  theorems  which  we  expect  to  be  true 
about  ESSs  may  fail  in  the  absence  of  regularity.  Our  main  dynamic-stabil- 
ity  theorem  in  Sec.  3 is  such  a  theorem. 
An  important  class  of  games  are  the  linear  games,  so  called  because  for 
every  i, F(i(p)  is linear  inp.  For  such  games  there  is a matrix  A,  called  the 
payoff  matrix,  for  which  F(i]p)  = a,p  and  F(qlp)  = qAp,  where  a,  is  the  ith 
row  of A.  For  a linear  game,  Eq.  (1) holds  with  o(s)=0  (A  being  the  payoff 
matrix),  and  so  if p  is  an  ESS,  it  follows  that  XAX < 0 whenever  supp(x)  c 
supp(p),  x#O,  and  Xx, = 0.  This  result  was  first  published  by  Haigh  [2]. 
Thus,  for  linear  games,  an  ESS  is regular  if ag  <pAp  whenever  i 4 supp(p). 
In  particular,  for  a  linear  game,  an  ESS  with  full  support  is  always  regular. 
3.  GAME  DYNAMICS 
In  order  to  discuss  stability,  we must  now  define  a dynamic  for  the  game. 
There  are  undoubtedly  many  ways  to  do  this,  each  related  to  certain 
hypotheses  about  the  population.  We  will  assume  a  population  of  haploid 
individuals,  each  using  the  same  pure  strategy  throughout  its  lifetime,  and 
producing  offspring  using  the  parent’s  strategy.  Then  the  change  in  the 
population’s  strategy  mix  is  determined  by  the  rate  at  which  the  users  of 
each  strategy  reproduce.  The  simplest  hypothesis  is  that  of  exponential 
growth  or  decay.  So  let  us  denote  by  ni  the  number  of  i-strategists  in  the 
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of  the  population  is  s=(s,,  . . . . s,),  where  si = n,/N  is  the  proportion  of 
i-strategists,  and  rii = rini, where  r, is  the  current  growth  rate  of  ni.  It  follows 
that  fi=  FN,  where  ?=Zsiri  is  the  average  growth  rate.  If  we  differentiate 
s, = ni/  N,  we  get  s, = si(ri -  r?. This  should  tell  us  how  s  moves  in  the  state 
space  K. 
To  put  this  into  our  game  framework,  let  us  suppose  that  the  fitness 
F(iJs)  of  a  strategy  is  an  estimate  of  the  growth  rate  r,.  In  terms  of  our 
reproductive  model,  this  means  we  must  choose  our  fitnesses  so that  in  time 
At  each  individual  gives  rise  to  F(ils)  At  additional  individuals.  Then  our 
dynamic  equation  becomes 
ii=si[  F(ils)-  F(sls)].  (2) 
Now  suppose  we have  discrete  generations.  We  interpret  r, as the  number 
of  new  individuals  each  individual  produces  in  unit  time.  Thus  if  an 
individual  simply  dies  without  offspring,  this  corresponds  to  r, = -  1. Other- 
wise  r, >  -  1. Letting  ri, denote  the  new  value  of  n,, we  have  the  difference 
equation  ri, = nj(ri + 1). We  calculate  $ = s,(r, + I)/(?+  1). Setting  r, = F(iJs) 
we  have 
As~=s,w)-w~) 
I  I  F(sjs)+  1  .  (4) 
The  difference  equation  (3) is the  one  most  convenient  to work  with,  but  the 
equation  (4) for  the  increment  As, = $ -  si allows  us  to  compare  the  continu- 
ous  (2) and  the  discrete  dynamics.  We  observe  that  if we plot  a trajectory  of 
s using  (4), we approximate  an  integral  curve  of  the  continuous  dynamic  (2). 
The  approximation  improves  with  increasing  F(sls)+  1. We  will  return  to 
this  point.  Let  us  also  remark  that  the  state  space  K  is,  as  expected, 
invariant  under  both  (2)  and  (3). 
In  Sec.  2  we  defined  the  notion  of  equilibrium  point  for  the  game.  We 
also  have  a  notion  of  equilibrium  point  for  (2)  (@=O)  and  for  (3)  (p^=p). 
All  three  notions  are  easily  seen  to  coincide.  We  will  now  look  at  how  the 
three  notions  of  stability  relate. 
If  p  is  an  equilibrium  point,  we  call  it  stable  if  every  trajectory  that 
begins  near  p  converges  towards  p.  To  examine  the  stability  of p  for  the 
continuous  dynamic  we  linearize  the  system  (2)  about  p.  That  is,  for  s E K 
we  let  x=s-p.  Then  ii=&,  and  so  (2)  becomes  &=(xi+pi)[F(ilx+p)- 
F(x  +p(x  +p)].  Collecting  only  those  terms  on  the  right-hand  side  that  are 
linear  in  x  gives  a system  of  the  form  z?  = Bx.  This  is the  linearization  of  (2) 150  PETER D.  TAYLOR  AND  LEO  B. JONKER 
about  p.  We  say  that  p  is strictly  stable  (against  perturbations  in  X.s, =  1) if 
the  eigenvalues  of  the  matrix  B  belonging  to  the  invariant  subspace  Zxi  = 0 
have  strictly  negative  real  part.  A  standard  theorem  in  differential  equations 
asserts  thatp  is stable  for  the  system  (2) if it is strictly  stable.  We  can  do  the 
same  thing  for  the  discrete  dynamic  (3)  to  get  the  linearization  ,?=  Cx.  In 
this  case  we  say  p  is  strictly  stable  (against  perturbations  in  Es; =  1) if  the 
eigenvalues  of  C  belonging  to  Xxi =0  have  modulus  strictly  less  than  one. 
As  before,  strict  stability  implies  stability. 
THEOREM 
If p  is  a  regular  ESS,  then  p  is  a  strictly  stable  equilibrium  point  of  the 
continuous  dynamical  system  (2),  restricted  to  K. 
The  proof  of  this  theorem  will  be  given  in  Sec.  4.  It  follows  from  this 
theorem  that,  for  the  continuous  dynamic,  a  regular  ESS  is  always  a  stable 
state.  In  fact,  it  will  be  shown  in  a remark  following  the  proof  that  a regular 
ESS  is  globally  stable  in  a  continuous  linear  game.  This  means  that  even 
after  a  large  perturbation  the  population  will  return  to  p,  provided  the 
perturbation  does  not  eliminate  entirely  any  strategy  that  was  used  before 
the  perturbation. 
For  the  discrete  dynamic  the  corresponding  result  is  false.  That  is,  for  a 
discrete  dynamic,  an  ESS  need  not  be  a  stable  equilibrium.  To  see  why  we 
might  expect  this,  consider  the  linear  game  with  three  pure  strategies  and 
payoff  matrix 
A=  1; 
i 
I  -1 
1 
1  1;  _e  ! 
It  is  not  hard  to  show  that  p =(f,  f,  f)  is  a  regular  ESS  if  E >O.  The 
continuous  dynamic  for  this  linear  game  is 
Since  uip =pAp,  the  linearization  about  p  is  given  by  Xi=pi(uix-xAp  - 
PAX).  Since  Xxi =0  this  simplifies  further  to  give  the  equations  li=piUiX. 
This  system  has  matrix  A /3.  The  eigenvalues  corresponding  to  the  subspace 
xxi  = 0 are  -  .s/3  ?  i/  fi  . As  E gets  close  to  zero  from  above  we  get  close 
to  a  situation  where  both  eigenvalues  are  imaginary.  This  implies  that  the 
trajectories  of  the  continuous  dynamic  (2)  are  almost  closed  orbits,  rather 
like  the  picture  in  Fig.  2 for  the  case  (Y  -3  (however,  these  figures  refer  to  a 
different  example).  Now  the  discrete  dynamic  (3) is equivalent  to  a numeri- 
cal  approximation  of  the  continuous  dynamic.  We  would  expect  a  numeri- 
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error  would  accumulate,  and  for  sufficiently  small  E > 0  we  would  expect, 
after  a  single  cycle  about  p,  to  be  outside  rather  than  inside  our  starting 
point.  Actually  it  is not  hard  to  show  by  direct  calculation  that  for  all  E > 0, 
p  fails  to  be  strictly  stable  for  the  discrete  dynamic. 
The  converse  of  the  theorem  is  also  not  true.  That  is,  a  strictly  stable 
equilibrium  point  of  the  continuous  dynamic  need  not  be  an  ESS.  To  see 
this,  consider  the  linear  game  with  three  pure  strategies  and  payoff  matrix 
2  1  5 
A=  5  OL  0 
I  I  1  4  3 
with  parameter  LY.  The  game  has  an  equilibrium  point  in  the  interior  of  the 
state  space  K (a  triangle)  if  -  8 <  (Y  <  8.5. As  (Y  moves  from  -  8 to  8.5, these 
equilibrium  points  trace  out  a  straight  line  from  (3,1,0)/4  on  one  edge  to 
(0,2,3)/5  on  another  (see  Fig.  1).  It  can  be  shown  that  this  equilibrium 
point  is  an  ESS  if  and  only  if  (Y  < 0.  However,  it  is  strictly  stable  for  (2)  if 
and  only  if  (Y  <  3. If  (Y  = 3 the  equilibrium  point  is  neutrally  stable,  and  can 
be  shown  to  be  in  fact  stable  by  looking  at  higher-order  terms.  From  this 
fact,  one  can  use  a  standard  argument  (which  only  works  in  the  plane)  to 
show  that  for  sufficiently  small  E  > 0,  the  case  (Y  = 3 + E must  have  a  stable 
limit  cycle  surrounding  the  unstable  equilibrium  point.  In  Fig.  2  we  have 
plotted  sample  trajectories  for  the  dynamical  system  (2)  for  various  values 
of (Y. 
0.=8 
FIG.  1.  The  line  of  equilibrium  points  corresponding  to  various  values  of  a.  The  point 
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Let  us  try  to  explain,  using  this  example,  why  the  notions  of  ESS  and 
strict  stability  do  not  coincide.  It  is  important  to  seek  such  an  explanation, 
because  the  result  is at  first  counterintuitive.  In  doing  so,  we  hope  to  clarify 
the  biological  significance  of  the  notion  of  ESS. 
Before  we  embark  on  this  explanation,  let  us  point  out  that  there  are  two 
different  ways  of  regarding  games  of  this  type.  Suppose  there  are  three  pure 
strategies.  Then  we  can  imagine  that  there  are  three  types  of  players  in  the 
population,  types  1, 2, and  3, and  a player  of type  i always  uses  strategy  i. A 
population  in  state  p  is  simply  one  in  which  the  proportion  of  players  of 
type  i  is pi.  On  the  other  hand  we  can  imagine  that  mixed  strategies  are 
available  to  each  player.  A  player  might  decide  to  play  strategy  1 with  a 
certain  probability,  strategy  2  with  another  probability,  and  strategy  3  the 
rest  of  the  time.  In  this  case,  to  get  the  statep  of  the  population  we  letp,  be 
Ihe  overall  proportion  of  times  that  i  is  played  at  that  time.  Which 
interpretation  is  most  suitable  will  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  game  and 
the  strategies  being  considered.  In  our  mathematical  treatment  we  do  not 
distinguish  between  the  two  interpretations.  But  for  the  purpose  of  the 
following  heuristic  discussion  let  us  use  the  first  interpretation.  Every  player 
is one  of  three  possible  types,  and  the  proportions  pi may  change  because  of 
differential  fitness. 
Take  the  case  a =  1. Then  p = (15,11,9)/35  is  the  equilibrium  point.  Let 
us  demonstrate  that  this  is  not  an  ESS.  Take  q=(18,17,0)/35  as  the 
perturbing  state  and  set j=  (I-  E)P + cq.  Let  us  write  down  the  fitness  of 
each  type  of player.  Note  that  Ap = (86,86,86)/35  and  Aq  = (53,107,86)/35. 
Then 
Takingp  and  q  averages, 
F(plj)=86/35-0.22e, 
F(qjj)=86/35-0.19&. 
-bus  F(plfi  < F(qlA  f or  any  E  > 0. That  is,  in  the  perturbed  population  j, 
the  q-group  has  higher  average  fitness  than  the  p-group,  and  this  implies 
that  p  is not  an  ESS. 
But  notice  that  the  q-group  is  composed  of  two  types  of  players,  type  1 
and  type  2,  and  these  types  do  not  have  equal  fitness.  Indeed  F(2)p2  is 
much  greater  than  F(llp?.  The  effect  of  this  fitness  difference  will  be  to 
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with  only  type-2  players).  As  the  state  changes  from  j,  the  direction  in 
which  the  population  moves  changes.  The  result  of  this  continual  change  is 
to  make  the  state  rotate  around  p  (see  Fig.  1) and  encounter  the  line  pq 
again  at  a  point  closer  top  than  j  is.  As  this  behavior  continues  the  state 
converges  top.  Thus p  is  stable. 
Could  the  q-group  have  taken  advantage  of  their  greater  than  average 
fitness?  Only  if  they  shared  this  fitness  in  such  a  way  as  to  preserve  the 
“q-ness”  of  the  group.  In  this  case,  this  would  require  a  transfer  of  fitness 
from  type-2  individuals  to  type-l  individuals,  so  that  the  ratio  of  type  1 to 
type  2  would  remain  at  18 : 17. This  measure  of  concerted  action  on  their 
part  would  certainly  alter  the  dynamics  and  would  presumably  move  the 
overall  state  away  from  j  in  the  direction  of  q. Just  what  would  ultimately 
happen  would  depend  upon  what  assumptions  we  wanted  to  make  about 
the  possibility  of  other  forms  of  concerted  action.  Indeed  we  would  really 
need  a new  kind  of  game  theory  to  handle  these  problems.  [The  experience 
of  the  social  scientists  is that  it  is very  difficult  to  build  a satisfactory  theory 
of  games  which  allows  for  cooperative  behavior  between  players.] 
What  then  is  the  significance  of  the  notion  of  ESS?  Let  us  use  heuristic 
language  at  this  point.  If  in  the  future  it  appears  to  be  biologically 
important  to  make  the  following  ideas  precise,  then  more  work  can  be  done 
in  this  direction.  If p  is  an  ESS,  then  p  is  stable  not  only  in  the  every-man- 
for-himself  game,  but  also  in  the  game  where  fitness  exchange  between 
different  types  is allowed.  If p  is not  an  ESS,  then  either  it is unstable  in  the 
every-man-for-himself  game  (e.g.  (Y  =4)  or  it is stable  in  this  game  (o =  1). In 
the  latter  case  it  will  always  be  vulnerable  to  some  concerted  action  on  the 
part  of  a  deviant  subgroup. 
It  would  appear  that  if  we  are  not  going  to  permit  fitness  exchanges 
between  different  strategies,  then  the  correct  notion  of  stable  equilibrium  is 
not  ESS,  but  our  notion  of  strict  stability.  However,  we  can  see at  least  four 
reasons  why  the  notion  of  ESS  will  be  the  one  that  continues  to  be  used  in 
practice.  First,  it  is  easy  to  use  and  work  with,  and  can  be  readily 
generalized  to  the  case  of  infinitely  many  strategies  (for  example,  the 
continuum  of  strategies  in  [5]).  Secondly,  our  notion  of  dynamic  stability 
required  us  to  make  an  assumption  about  the  way  in  which  fitness  is 
translated  into  growth,  and  hence  relative  growth  of  the  different  p.  We 
chose  the  simplest  exponential  model,  but  others  may  lead  to  different 
notions  of  stability.  The  definition  of  ESS  does  not  require  these  assump- 
tions.  Thirdly,  the  games  that  have  arisen  in  the  biological  literature  seem  to 
have  enough  ESSs  to  account  for  our  observations.  Only  if  we  were  to  find 
a real  game  which  seemed  to  persist  in  a state  which  was  not  an  ESS,  would 
we  be  inclined  to  look  for  stable  equilibrium  points  of  a  suitable  system  of 
differential  equations.  Fourthly,  many  of  the  games  which  have  arisen  in ESS GAME  DYNAMICS  155 
the  literature  have  only  2 pure  strategies.  In  this  case,  as  is easily  seen,  strict 
stability  and  ESS  are  equivalent. 
4.  PROOF  OF  THE  THEOREM 
We  may  suppose  that  supp(p)  = { 1,2,.  . . , k}.  Let  A  be  the  matrix  defined 
by 
and  let  ai  denote  its  ith  row.  Since  F(Q)-  F(p(p)=O  when  I<  i & k,  and 
since  pi -0  when  i>  k,  the  linearization  of  (2)  about  p  is  given  by  the 
equations 




,  l<i<k,  (5) 
i >  k.  (6) 
Now  the  F(ilp)  are  all  equal  to  F(p(p)  for  1 Q i Q k,  so  that  (5)  can  be 
written 
%=A (  a,x-pAx-,=~+,5[F(jlp)-F(plp)]  ,  1 
using  the  fact  that  Cxj  = 0. Thus  the  entire  system  can  be  written 
G  H  x=3x=  o  R  x, 
[  1 
(7) 
where  G  is  the  k X k  matrix  with  entries  gU==pi[uti-(pA)j],  and  R  is 
diagonal  with  entries  rii=F(ilp)-F(plp).  The  numbers  rii  are  all  <0  by 
our  regularity  assumption. 
Now,  for  any  matrix  D,  let  D(j)  be  the  matrix  obtained  from  D  by 
subtracting  column  j  from  every  column  and  omitting  the  jth  row  and 
column.  If  the  subspace  XX, = 0  is  invariant  under  D,  then  the  eigenvalues 
of D  which  belong  to  this  subspace  are just  the  eigenvalues  of  D ci) for  any j. 
This  is  because  Do  gives  the  same  transformation  as  D  on  the  subspace 
ZXi = 0 provided,  when  using  D 0,  we  omit  the jth  entry  of  all  our  vectors. 
Returning  to  our  proof,  it  is  enough  to  show  that  the  eigenvalues  of  Bck) 
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so  that  we  will  be  finished  if ‘we can  show  that  the  eigenvalues  of  Gck) have 
negative  real  part.  The  simplest  way  to  do  this  is  to  think  of  the  dynamical 
system  i=  Gx  on  Rk.  Let  V(x)=Z~x,~/Z  p,.  We  will  show  that  in  the  sub- 
space  X:x,  = 0,  V(x)  decreases  along  trajectories  of  this  dynamical  system. 
Indeed 
using  the  regularity  of  p  and  the  fact  that  2x,=0.  We  call  V(x)  a 
Lyapounov  function  for  G  in  the  subspace  Cx,  =O.  It  follows  that  the 
eigenvalues  of  GCk) have  negative  real  part  [3, (6.5)]. 
The  proof  appears  awkward,  but  it  seems  to  be  unavoidably  so.  The 
problem  is  that  the  block-triangular  form  of  B  does  not  fit  nicely  with  the 
subspace  2:x, = 0.  However,  if p  has  full  support,  then  B = G  and  we  need 
only  work  with  the  Lyapounov  function. 
This  completes  the  proof  of  the  theorem.  A  slightly  different  argument, 
using  the  Lyapounov  function 







shows  that  a  regular  ESS  in  a  linear  game  is globally  stable. 
We  would  like  to acknowledge  the  he4  of  the  referees  in  making  the paper 
more  accessible  to a biological  audience. 
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